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Abstract  
Insider’s malicious information security behaviours have always been a persistent problem 
and requiring urgent mitigation solutions. More recently, seminal calls for future research 
suggested exploring the influences of employee-workplace interaction and pre-kinetic events 
such as organisational injustice since they are argued to hold potential impacts on the 
insider’s intention to perform abusive computer behaviours. This study responds to those 
calls by investigating the relationship between organisational injustice and insider’s intention 
to commit malicious security behaviours. In addition, it employed General Strain Theory–a 
highly influential theory in criminology yet receives little attention in information security 
behavioural research. The literature review suggested the employed theory to have close 
relationship with organisational injustice concepts, therefore adds more explanations to why 
insiders deliberately perform computer abuses. As a result, a testable conceptual model 
incorporating strains, disgruntlement and organisational injustice is proposed to describe the 
relationships between those factors and insider’s malicious information security behaviours. 
The research concludes with the model’s potential implications, limitations and provides 
future directions. 
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1. Introduction 
Research on computer users’ behaviours has been playing vital role in maintaining 
organisational information security yet still falls short of contributions (Crossler et al. 2013). 
As a result, scholars in the field are calling for studies that incorporate multidisciplinary 
perspectives to enrich the current knowledge body, especially about exploring the insider’s 
malicious information security behaviours (Warkentin and Willison 2009; Willison and 
Warkentin 2013). Of most importance is the extended Security Action Cycle (Willison and 
Warkentin 2013) introducing the pre-kinetic events that would lead to the insider’s intention 
to perform computer abuses. 
 
By definition, pre-kinetic events result from the interaction between the employees and their 
workplace environment (Willison and Warkentin 2013). More important, while these events 
are argued to influence the intention to perform malicious behaviours, their effects are 
determined by the harmony between the potential perpetrators and their workplace. For 
instance, the perpetrator’s abusive intention could be reinforced by disgruntlement that 
results from negative interaction between them and their organisation’s environment 
(Willison and Warkentin 2013). Understanding those events would help to prevent the 
abusive intention by improving the employees-workplace interaction, thus holds practical 
implications. Since the concept of pre-kinetic events in information security behavioural 
research has just been introduced, it is empirical to establish a solid foundation for future 
knowledge to be built upon. 
 
This paper proposes an empirical conceptual model with testable hypotheses that incorporate 
theoretical constructs from organisational injustice literature and General Strain Theory 
(Agnew 2009) to predict the employee’s intention to commit malicious security behaviours. 
The structure of the paper is as follow. First, a literature review is performed to justify the 
research motivations and establish a framework of theoretical constructs. Next, the paper 
provides a set of testable hypotheses that frame the conceptual model. Potential implications 
of the proposed conceptual model are then presented. Finally, the conclusion discusses the 
limitations and future directions to continue from this paper. 
 
2. Research motivations 
It is common to find studies that investigate information security issues by adopting 
multidisciplinary perspectives (Anderson and Moore 2009). For example, Protection 
Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975) is a theory in medical research that has been widely 
employed to investigate the cognitive process contributing to the intention to perform 
adaptive computer behaviours. Specifically, the theory explores the cognitive factors 
associating with the user’s appraisal processes on the threats and the measures that counter 
such threats. These factors (i.e. perceived severity and vulnerability, response cost and 
efficacy, self-efficacy and rewards) were found to impact the user’s intention to perform 
various desirable information security behaviours such as compliance with policy (Herath 
and Rao 2009; Siponen et al. 2007; Vance et al. 2012), adopt online privacy measures 
(Mohamed and Ahmad 2012), avoid malware in BYOD environment (Dang et al. 2013) and 
install anti-virus software (Lee et al. 2008). Likewise, Health Belief Model (Janz and Becker 
1984) was also employed by a number of research to study information security behaviours 
(e.g. Liang and Xue 2009, 2010; Ng et al. 2009; Workman 2007). However, these two 
theories from the medical field were originally applied to investigate the contributing factors 
of healthy lifestyle (Boer et al. 1996; Janz and Becker 1984). In consequence, the inevitable 
limitation of both theories is that they were not suitable for explaining abusive intentions. 
 
Criminology theories were also considered in information security behavioural research. Of 
most significance is the applications of General Deterrence Theory (GDT) which examines 
the controlling effects of sanction in information security context (e.g. Herath and Rao 2009; 
Hu et al. 2011; Seppo et al. 2007). Sanctions, which focus on the punishment’s severity, 
certainty and celerity or swiftness (Hu et al. 2011), enable investigations on both compliance 
and noncompliance intentions. For example, Lee et al. (2004) studied the impacts of GDT’s 
factors on the intention to commit computer abuses. The implementation of security systems 
was found to have statistically significant influence on self-defence intention which 
subsequently motivates abuses by insiders and invaders (Lee et al. 2004). In contrast, Hu et 
al. (2011) did not find any impacts of deterrence on intention to abuse, therefore concluded 
that deterrence alone failed to reduce such intention. On the other hand, the effects of GDT’s 
factors on different compliance intentions were tested by a number of studies. Notably, Son 
(2011) found consistent findings about the non-statistically significant impacts of 
deterrence’s factors on the employee’s intention to comply with information security policy. 
Indeed, these studies displayed that the impacts of GDT on compliance/non-compliance 
intentions remain inconsistent and require further empirical research. In addition, GDT limits 
to only extrinsic impacts thus leaves the intrinsic factors less explored, albeit they are argued 
to possess stronger effects on compliance intentions (Son 2011). More recently, Karyda et al. 
(2005) suggested the potential applications of other criminology theories such as Social Bond 
Theory, Social Learning Theory, Theory of Planned Behaviour and Situational Crime 
Prevention. Nonetheless, the literature review of this paper returned very few results of those 
theories in information security research. 
 
The previous discussions have provided the motivations to conduct this study. First, 
incorporating multidisciplinary theories is a common practice to investigate the contributing 
factors of intention to perform information security behaviours. Second, while the commonly 
adopted Protection Motivation Theory has been producing consistent and significant findings 
regarding the motivations of desirable behaviours, there is little theoretical base that explains 
the abusive ones. As there is a lack of criminology theories applied to investigate abusive 
intention, it is argued that empirical contributions incorporating crimes-related theories for 
this purpose could produce novel results. Similarly, this paper’s use of General Strain Theory 
as a criminology theory was justified.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
Our theoretical framework incorporates multidisciplinary concepts and theories that 
altogether explain how the negative interaction between the employees and their workplace 
environment could potentially lead to their intention to commit abusive security behaviours. 
Specifically, these constructs are drawn upon General Strain Theory (including strains and 
negative emotions) and literature about organisational injustice. 
 
3.1. General Strain Theory 
General Strain Theory (GST) was revised and developed by Agnew (2009) upon the classic 
strain theories that date back to the 1960s. The central idea of GST is about three types of 
stressful events that encourage an individual to commit crimes through the production of 
strains. Specifically, these strains arise when a person is (1) prevented from achieving 
positive goals, (2) removed positive stimuli that they possess, or (3) presented with noxious 
or negative stimuli (Agnew and White 1992 p. 476). In brief, GST focuses on the negative 
relationships with the others that pressure a person to commit crimes (Agnew 2009). 
 
The theory was originally introduced to predict delinquency and drug use by adolescents 
(Agnew and White 1992) and later on became highly influential in criminology and criminal 
justice journals (as cited in DeLisi 2011). More recently, Langton and Piquero (2007) 
asserted that GST could predict white-collar crimes (which include cybercrime), thus 
supports its potential applications in predicting malicious information security behaviours. In 
addition, information systems occupations have been suggested to be highly stressful (Thong 
and Yap 2000). Consequently, information systems professionals may be extremely prone to 
strains that encourage them to commit white-collar crimes as the insiders. Nonetheless, very 
few information security behavioural studies were found to apply Agnew's GST (2009) or 
incorporate strains into empirical models that explain computer abusive behaviours. 
 
3.2. Organisational injustice 
In GST, Agnew (2001) argued that strains resulting from various stressful situations could 
have different capabilities in motivating the intention to commit crimes. More specifically, 
strains that are perceived as unjust would more likely motivate intention to commit crimes 
through invocation of negative emotions (Agnew 2009). As a result, this paper incorporates 
the concepts of organisational injustice from management and organisational studies to 
explain in details how the employees perceive unjustness from strains. Organisational 
injustice depicts the perceived unfairness in (1) the outcomes (distributive injustice), (2) the 
procedures determining the outcomes (procedural injustice) and (3) the treatments received 
from the others (interactional injustice) (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001). It is also worth 
noticing that the first two forms of injustice are regarded as structural as they are most likely 
produced by poor interaction with the organisation. On the other hand, interactional injustice 
involves more the social part as it concerns the interaction between the employees and their 
peers or supervisors, thus called social form. 
 
Unlike organisational injustice, the counterpart organisational justice and its influences on 
information security behaviours have been investigated by a number of prior studies. For 
instance, Posey et al. (2011) investigated the reinforcement role of organisational justice 
towards internal computer abuses. Specifically, they found monitoring at workplace actually 
defeated its purpose and encouraged abusive information security behaviours as retaliation to 
the workplace. Moreover, Lim (2002) found significant relationships between organisational 
justice in reducing cyber-loafing by the employees. Nevertheless, it was rare to find studies 
investigating organisational injustice and their impacts on malicious computer behaviours. 
 
Most recently, the concept of organisational injustice was recommended for future 
information security behavioural research by Willison and Warkentin (2013) to understand 
the causes and targets of malicious security behaviours, especially the intentional ones by the 
insiders. Similarly, literature outside information security behavioural area confirmed the 
links between the three forms of injustice and counterproductive or deviant work behaviours 
(e.g. Bechtoldt et al. 2007; Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Cropanzana et al. 2007; Francis 
and Barling 2005; Scheuerman 2013). As a result, organisational injustices were hinted to 
potentially reinforce the employee’s intention to perform abusive information security 
behaviours. Similar to the lack of GST applications in information security behavioural 
research, very few studies were found to link organisational injustice with workplace’s 
strains. This paper’s theoretical framework consisting of GST and organisational injustice is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed theoretical framework (adapted from General Strain Theory and 
organisational injustice literature) 
 
4. Hypotheses development and conceptual model 
The reviewed literature above has justified the relevant theories and concepts that could help 
to achieve this paper’s research goal. The goal includes developing a conceptual model that 
predicts the insider’s intention to commit malicious security behaviours. Having General 
Strain Theory and organisational injustice as the underpinning theoretical framework, the 
model argues that the strains resulting from the poor interaction between the employees and 
their workplace would reinforce their intention to perform malicious security behaviours as 
the insider. This reinforcing relationship is further explained by the invocation of perceived 
organisational injustice and disgruntlement. Testing the model’s hypotheses would answer 
the following questions and their sub-questions: 
• RQ1. What are the contributing factors of insider’s intention to perform malicious 
information security behaviours (including organisation- and individual-targeted 
behaviours)? 
• RQ2. To what extent would these contributing factors motivate insider’s intention to 
perform malicious information security behaviours? 
 
 
4.1. Strains and organisational injustices 
It is necessary to identify what constitute strains and how to measure the strains construct so 
to assist future testing of the model. Accordingly, GST defined strains to be experienced by 
the employees from a variety of undesirable events. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
strains construct is measured in formative model comprising of different stressful situations. 
Agnew (2001) provided a list of strains that are considered as weakly or strongly related to 
crimes. Based on this list and own observations, this paper suggests four strains that are 
relevant to information systems professions and their workplace, namely (1) mismatching 
expectations, (2) sanction pressure, (3) job dissatisfaction and (4) abusive peers. 
 
First, Agnew (2001 p. 345) proposed “work in a secondary labour market” as a strain 
reflecting negative perceptions of “unpleasant task, little autonomy, coercive control, low 
pay, few benefits, little prestigious, and very limited opportunities for advancement” and thus 
perceived as unjust by the employees. This strain is separated into mismatching expectations 
(covering the perceived lacks of monetary rewards, benefits, prestige and opportunities for 
advancement) and job dissatisfaction (including coercive control/insecurity while adding 
excessive workload and complex procedures). By doing so, it helps to increase the validity of 
each construct. For instance, a set of observable variables that measure the facets of job 
dissatisfaction alone would produce more accurate result than measuring both constructs 
together as originally suggested. In addition, it aligns the strains to match better the types of 
injustice that each of them would invoke. For example, it is anticipated that mismatching 
expectations construct would be more likely to invoke distributive injustice which concerns 
the perceived unfairness when evaluating contributions versus rewards (Cropanzana et al. 
2007). As a result, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
• H1. Mismatching expectations positively contribute to strains. 
• H2. Job dissatisfaction positively contributes to strains. 
 
 
Second, sanction pressure was added into the model according to one of Agnew's (2001) 
suggested strains. Specifically, the author asserted that the employees would feel stressful 
under supervision or discipline that are “very strict, erratic, excessive given the infraction, 
and/or harsh” (Agnew 2001 p. 344). This construct is related to the sanction construct of 
General Deterrence Theory (GDT). Nevertheless, while GDT depicts the potential 
threatening effects of sanction such as punishment’s severity, certainty and celerity, the 
construct in this context measures the manners with which it is delivered. Indeed, as sanction 
has been studied for its controlling effects on compliance (e.g. Herath and Rao 2009; Seppo 
et al. 2007), investigating the impacts of this construct’s interactive nature on noncompliance 
may produce interesting results. It is expected that sanction pressure would most likely 
contribute to perception of interactional injustice if insults, threats and excessively strict 
discipline were perceived as unfair. The hypothesis is proposed as below: 
• H3. Sanction pressure positively contributes to strains. 
 
 
Third, abusive peers construct focuses on the strain resulting from the poor interaction 
between the employees and their colleagues. This strain was adopted from Agnew's work 
(2001 p. 346) which includes “insults/ridicule, gossip, threats, attempts to coercive, and 
physical assaults”. Nevertheless, this study suggested removing the measure of physical 
assaults due to its rare occurrence in workplace. Given the interactive nature of this strain, it 
is expected that this strain would likely to result in perception of interactional injustice. The 
following hypothesis is presented. 
• H4. Abusive peers positively contribute to strains. 
 
 
As previously discussed that perception of unjustness (i.e. organisational injustice) plays 
important role in determining how likely a strain could motivate intention to commit the 
malicious information security behaviours, the following hypotheses are presented. 
• H5. Strains positively contribute to the employee’s perception of distributive injustice. 
• H6. Strains positively contribute to the employee’s perception of procedural injustice. 
• H7. Strains positively contribute to the employee’s perception of interactional injustice. 
 
 
3.3. Organisational injustices and insider’s malicious security behaviours 
To explain in-depth how organisational injustices could reinforce intention to perform 
malicious security behaviours, negative emotions are added as a mediator. In fact, perceived 
unfairness was asserted to provoke negative emotions that subsequently foster crimes 
(Agnew 2001). Such idea was tested in Yang and Diefendorff's work (2009) which found 
significant relationships between interpersonal injustice and counterproductive workplace 
behaviours mediated by negative emotions. Consistently, the links between these three 
factors have been mentioned in many organisational and management studies (Spector et al. 
2006). Agnew (2009) also recommended a variety of negative emotions that impact various 
types of crimes such as anger, depression and fear. Most recently, Willison and Warkentin 
(2013) suggested future investigations of disgruntlement as a motive of computer abuses. 
Likewise, disgruntlement was argued to be a psychological indicator of insider’s threat 
(Greitzer et al. 2010). In fact, anger could energise the perpetrator while making them 
disregard positive information and reduce the costs of crime, thus motivates the crimes 
(Agnew 2001). While there are numerous negative emotions that could reinforce crimes 
(Agnew 2009), anger or disgruntlement receives the most consensus so far in predicting 
crimes but not computer-related ones, therefore appears worth exploring for its mediator role. 
As a result, the below hypotheses are added. 
• H8. Perception of distributive injustice positively contributes to disgruntlement. 
• H9. Perception of procedural injustice positively contributes to disgruntlement. 
• H10. Perception of interactional injustice positively contributes to disgruntlement. 
 
 
3.4. Determining insider’s abusive security behaviours 
Last but not least, this section determines the insider’s malicious security behaviours that 
could be suitably predicted by the proposed model. While malicious computer behaviours are 
commonly bound to the concept of counterproductive work behaviours, a number of 
information security studies have identified and categorised further such behaviours based on 
their intention and consequences. For instance, Loch et al. (1992) introduced the 
categorisation of information systems’ threats in which “internal human’s threats” were 
classified according to their intentions, namely “non-volitional noncompliance”, “volitional 
(but not malicious) noncompliance” and “intentional malicious abuse”. Likewise, the recent 
study of Crossler et al. (2013) also separates maladaptive behaviours of insiders into 
intentionally (i.e. deviant behaviours) and unintentionally conducted (i.e. misbehaviours). In 
addition, the taxonomy by Stanton et al. (2005) also detailed two types of intentional 
malicious behaviours apart from the rest based on their national-wide survey’s results. As this 
study focuses on disgruntlement as a motivator of insider’s malicious behaviours, it is 
reasonably expected that a disgruntled employee would perform abusive computer 
behaviours deliberately. Therefore, the proposed conceptual model could be most relevant to 
predict malicious behaviours that are performed intentionally rather than careless misuses. 
 
The category of intentional malicious behaviours is further organised based on different 
criteria. For example, Stanton et al. (2005) classified malicious computer behaviours with 
deliberate intention according to the perpetrator’s technical expertise. Moreover, Willison 
and Warkentin (2013) suggested that malicious security behaviours by the insiders could be 
identified separately depending on their targets. Specifically, retaliations aiming at the 
organisation such as deliberate noncompliance with security policy or selling confidential 
information would occur if the disgruntled employee perceived unfair rewards or harsh 
policy. On the other hand, poor interaction between employees would result in personal 
malicious behaviours that target individuals such as harassing or sabotaging each one’s work.  
 
 
Since the conceptual model includes the forms of injustice that are caused by structural (i.e. 
distributive and procedural injustice) and social (i.e. interactional injustice) factors, it would 
be most justified to consider Willison and Warkentin's suggestion (2013). Specifically, it is 
anticipated that structural forms of organisational injustice would lead to organisation-
targeted retaliations. On the other hand, the social form would result in personal, individual-
targeted malicious behaviours that aim at the perpetrator’s colleagues. As a result, the 
following hypotheses are proposed. 
• H11. Disgruntlement positively contributes to intention to perform organisation-targeted 
malicious information security behaviours. 
• H12. Disgruntlement positively contributes to intention to perform individual-targeted 
malicious information security behaviours. 
 
 
The conceptual model with all of its hypotheses is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Proposed conceptual model 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
4.1. Potential implications for practice and research 
Insider’s malicious information security behaviours have always been widely regarded as a 
persistent and devastating problem due to its damages and unpredictable nature. As a result, 
emerging and seminal calls for future research (e.g. Crossler et al. 2013; Warkentin and 
Willison 2009; Willison and Warkentin 2013) have focused on this critical problem. This 
study responds to those calls and proposes a conceptual model that could potentially bring 
practical and theoretical implications. 
 
By determining the impacts of “pre-kinetic events” (i.e. strains and organisational injustice) 
on the insider’s intention to commit malicious security behaviours, practical implications 
may include mitigating the insider problem through adjustments of policy and workplace’s 
conditions. In addition, employees’ perception of strains and injustice could be exploited to 
improve compliance and reduce potential intention to commit computer abuses. Moreover, 
the findings may help to clarify whether traditional security controls would reduce abusive 
computer behaviours or increase the likelihood of those behaviours through strains. 
 
On the other hand, testing the model would shed light on a number of theoretical 
implications. First, the proposed model employs General Strain Theory (Agnew 2009) which 
is highly influential in criminology but has not yet received attention in information security 
behavioural research. Given that the theory is applicable for white-collar crimes (Langton and 
Piquero 2007) and information systems professionals are highly prone to occupational strains 
(Thong and Yap 2000), it could be reasonable to argue that testing the GST in information 
security context may bring interesting and novel results. More important, it contributes 
knowledge to extend the Security Action Cycle (Straub and Welke 1998) which has been 
widely used in information security research. 
 
4.2. Future directions 
The future work continuing this paper intends to consult more the extant literature (especially 
in criminology and justice) and experts in the field so that the theoretical framework could be 
refined. In particular, a qualitative approach would be very much useful to gather and explore 
insights of information systems professionals about topics such as occupational strains, 
organisational injustice and insider’s malicious security behaviours. After refining the 
conceptual components and the conceptual model, a pilot study is recommended to assess 
validity and reliability of the constructs before conducting the main study. 
 
4.3. Limitations 
Despite the paper has developed the conceptual model according to suggestions and 
confirmed findings from seminal studies, the literature review was not exhaustive. In fact, the 
model is designed to test only the effects of four strains (i.e. mismatching expectations, job 
dissatisfaction, sanction pressure and abusive peers) on the two specific types of malicious 
security behaviours (i.e. organisation- and individual-targeted), which are mediated by 
disgruntlement. As a result, other relevant constructs could be considered and added to the 
current theoretical framework. 
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